RSN Singh is a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research and Analysis Wing, or R&AW. The author of two books: Asian Strategic and Military Perspective and Military Factor in Pakistan, he is also Associate Editor, Indian Defence Review. The attack on the army convoy by alleged pro-LTTE hoodlums near Coimbatore while army personnel stood by as mute spectators was a despicable and pathetic sight.
LTTE supporters attack Army convoy in Coimbatore
This convoy was probably returning after a field firing exercise, an important training event in which higher caliber arms, grenades, rocket-launchers, anti-tank missiles, and 81mm mortar are fired. Alternatively, the troops may have been returning after an inter-battalion 81mm mortar competition.
All training in the army is for war, and the very purpose of war is the defence of the country in which every citizen has a stake. The perpetrators of the attack, as evident from the video footage, forced the army personnel out of their vehicles, smashed front and window screens and indulged in pillage of the payload, which included ammunition. 81mm ammunition was strewn all over the road, some of which was set on fire.
If the army cannot protect its own vehicles, equipment and fighting wherewithal against a few hoodlums, how can it be expected to protect the country? More than anything else, the attack was on the dignity and self-pride of the army without provocation of any sort. The imperative of the movement was swift action instead of the politically loaded statements by one of the army personnel, quoted as saying that : `I am also a Tamil`. Convoy protection drills are a part of basic army training, but was nowhere in evidence.
`Minimum use of force` cannot be construed as `no use of force` while dealing with situations like this. `Minimum use of force` does not imply using sticks and belts, which later the army personnel resorted to, but it called for a definite and minimally appropriate response in terms of `fire for effect`. It is the rudimentary imperative to maintain the deterrence value of the army as an institution, and the ultimate instrument of internal security. Two or three rounds of ammunition aimed at the legs of attackers could have prevented the humiliation the army personnel and the institution of the army.
During the IPKF deployment in Sri Lanka, in Tamil Nadu, army personnel were jeered and greeted with slogans like, `IPKF dogs go back`, but never did the army personnel come under physical attack. Ironically, it is the same army which Tamil Nadu politicians like Karunanidhi and Vaiko want to see deployed to stem the imminent rout of the LTTE at the hands of the Sri Lankan security forces. The deterrence value of the army has been gradually eroding as clearly evident during the `Gujjar agitation,` and the recent incident near Coimbatore.
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The scale, intensity, frequency and audacity of such attacks on the army will only increase if it is unduly restrained by the army and the political leadership, which consequently seem to be vacillating when confronted with such situations.
When the army mobilizes for war or any other purpose, its induction and de-induction is also a vital part of the operations. The time schedule for mobilization is sacrosanct, as it impinges on the impending operations. If the army allows itself to become helpless objects of violent ire by a section of population (as invariably will be the case), which does not appreciate the national cause, then the war will be lost even before battles are joined.
Moreover, the army`s arsenal and the nation`s strategic war making assets are mainly transported by railways and road transport. These are sensitive national assets and are therefore transported under the protection of armed escorts. In the process of providing protection, if they encounter any physical interference, they are at complete liberty to use their weapons, no matter how many lives may have to be sacrificed.
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The army therefore should not any longer suffer the officers and men responsible for the smooth movement of the convoy in this case, as they have not only failed to act in the appropriate professional manner, but have also shown cowardice.
Meanwhile, the army leadership must convey a strong message to the subordinates that initiative and courage in dealing with such situations will be appreciated without any legal or other caveats.
Article courtesy Indian Defence Review |
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