Air power to fight guerrilla war

Arjun

Air Cmde Arjun Subramaniam is an experienced fighter pilot who is presently commanding Air Force Station Hindan.

"This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin - war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, terrorists, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called “wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it … a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.�

India faces challenges like never before when it comes to tackling the lower end of the spectrum of warfare. The ongoing conflict with the Naxalites and the terror attacks in Mumbai are but grim reminders of this new reality. Preparing for the ‘big battle’ has always been the raison’ d’être of most militaries the world over. Even the militaries of the US and Israel, which have talked about this genre of warfare for decades, realised its all pervasive influence only after being rudely tested in Iraq and Lebanon.

The period after the Second World War saw economically progressive nations with large and powerful militaries develop an ability to effectively use military power as a potent tool of coercion in furtherance of state policy by engaging in coercive diplomacy. Before going further, there is a preliminary need to establish a linkage between the coercive capability of large powers and the emergence of Sub-Conventional or Irregular Warfare as a means of combating this capability.

During the Cold War, coercion became akin to a game, with the US and the USSR testing their coercive capabilities across the globe using divergent tactics with different tools, but having similar objectives, viz expansion of influence and interests. Deterrence and coercion worked side by side and were complementary to one another. The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of a deeply fragmented world that suddenly saw the emergence of numerous localised conflicts that were based on fundamental differences of race, religion and ethnicity.

Terrorists, insurgents and freedom fighters found remarkably new ways of fighting established states and combating the coercive capabilities of established nations or even coalitions with what is now commonly known as asymmetric warfare. Thus, if one were to look across the spectrum of conflict – while powerful nations like the US, Russia and India and even smaller nations like Sri Lanka and Israel attempted to avoid ‘full scale’ war fighting methods to resolve conflicts and attempted to evolve coercive conflict resolution methods, their opponents excelled at what has emerged in recent times as techniques of ‘Sub Conventional and Irregular Warfare’ that eat away gradually at the fabric of the state.Therefore, one can deduce that sub-conventional warfare has emerged as an effective counter to a larger nation’s ability to coerce, and the tools used are in stark contrast to the tools of conventional coercion, be it diplomatic or military.

Also read: Indian Air Force: What lies ahead | Counter-terror: The state gets some teeth

Coercion & irregular warfare

If one were to look closely at the capabilities of both blocs during the Cold War, all the main weapons of coercion used the medium of air, whether it was the Strategic Bomber or the ICBM. Some of the searching questions that need to be asked relate to the query that if air power played a pivotal role in coercion during that era, can it assume an equally important role in tackling today’s biggest threat to established and civilized society, viz Sub Conventional Warfare?The starting point would be to briefly examine the spectrum of conflict with specific reference to the dwindling possibility of conventional and limited wars, and arrive at the most probable scenarios for the future.

The inability of smaller countries, entities and non-state actors to counter coercion with open force, and fight conventional wars have led to the emergence of war-fighting concepts with esoteric names like Sub-Conventional, Irregular, and Assymetric Warfare. Were these logical fallout or precipitated by history?  In the post Cold War era, and at places even during the Cold War, failure of coercion invariably led to gradually escalated use of force. Classic examples were the Vietnam conflict, the Indian peace keeping and enforcement operations in Sri Lanka, the Kargil Operation and the Lebanon war of 2006. Air power formed the primary tool for escalation and at places like Kargil and probably Sri Lanka, the much-needed catalyst for conflict resolution, too.

Some important questions that need to be asked and answered are – How successful has the application of air power been so far in combating sub conventional warfare? What have been the restraining factors and limitations of air power in small wars? Has technology offered new perspectives and possibilities on the use of air power in small wars, sub conventional conflicts and irregular warfare? Finally, if technology is exploited to the hilt, can air power be exploited in a manner that the perpetrator of sub conventional warfare be dragged to the negotiating table by causing unacceptable attrition and exerting exhausting pressure the way the Sri Lankan Air Force is exerting on the LTTE? If so, has air power not once again acted as an instrument of coercion, though this time not against established nations but against non state actors, terrorists and insurgents?

In the modern era of warfare, Israelis have been pioneers in the use of air and space assets to prosecute a campaign against non-state actors like the Hamas and Hezbollah, without needlessly or prematurely committing ground forces. Though their strategy has met with limited success and evoked widespread international condemnation, it has certainly opened new vistas for employment of air power at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. While a number of eminent academics and theorists like William Lind have unraveled the confusion that exists at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare, it is important to try and put it in simpler terms that is easily understandable by everyone.

This warfare typically includes skirmishes between two adversaries prior to actual full scale conflict, insurgencies and proxy wars like the ones being faced by India in the north-eastern parts of the country and in J&K, wars of liberation based on ethnic divides as being waged by the Kurds and other non-state actors like the LTTE, and blatant acts of terrorism that are guided by religious extremism like the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers or the Mumbai attacks of 26/11.

After years of trying to fingerprint this genre of warfare, theorists have zeroed in on two terms that typecast these categories of waging conflict, viz. sub-conventional warfare and irregular warfare. Both these terms reflect the flexibility and unpredictability with which these wars are fought, as also the difficulty for regular armed forces in formulating tactics and strategies to fight these battles.

Choosing the right weapons and training regular forces to think and train in a manner that contradicts age old tenets of war-fighting are other dilemmas that merit constant attention. Having tried to understand some typical facets of sub-conventional or irregular warfare, it is now time to focus on the Naxalite movement that has been troubling India since the early sixties and now threatens her very fabric. Dissecting the movement is not within the purview of this article and it is assumed that the reader has a basic grasp of what Naxalism is and how it has assumed such a threatening posture.

Also read: Our military mess | Why Assam bleeds

Naxalism and air power

One of the reasons why Naxalites have attacked the Indian para-military forces with impunity and great success is that they realize domestic political compulsions have ensured that the armed forces are kept away from fighting an insurgency that is rapidly spreading in the hinterland of India.

The armed forces in general have been chary of joining the fight against the Naxals because they are already overstretched in J&K and the North-East. The IAF, too, is heavily committed in the same areas and does not have the resources to significantly influence operations against the Naxalites. Another interesting aspect that has seldom been understood is the demographic nature of Naxalism vis-à-vis other insurgencies worldwide. In most other countries, insurgencies have grown on geographical peripheries where insurgents have aspirations of independence and have had support from ethnically similar regions in neighbouring countries. Typical examples are the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq and Turkey, the ethnic strife in the Balkans, the Chechen rebellion and, to some extent, the Islamic unrest in the border province of Sinkiang in South-Eastern China.

In India, too, the insurgency in the North East and the proxy war in J&K have received tacit support from meddlesome and ethnically similar neighbours. In such situations, it is not difficult to rationalize and motivate regular troops and airmen to fight the insurgencies as they visibly threaten national security. The Naxalite movement, however, is an insurgency that is spreading in the hinterland, with the same regions being represented in the armed forces. Whether this would be an impediment when it comes to having to join the fight against Naxalism is something that needs to be kept in mind by the government and policy makers.

SEARCH