‘26/11 has made no difference’

RSN Singh is a former R&AW officer and the author of Asian Strategic and Military Perspective and The Military Factor in Pakistan. He is Associate Editor, Indian Defence Review

The Mumbai terrorist strike of 26/11 exposed the confusion and near paralysis of our security system in responding to terror attacks.

Such an attack through the sea, whose probability was debated in Parliament based on a series of inputs from intelligence agencies, should have elicited swift response. That the response was sluggish was not on account of lack of security resources in terms of manpower or agencies, but due to the inadequacy of professional imagination, absence of proper command and control structure, lack of informed advice, and poor decision-making.

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The only unintended positive ramification of the long-stretched Mumbai operation was that the nation, courtesy the media, realised what havoc a handful of terrorists could inflict on a large country like India. Otherwise, to have lost 12 hours between the commencement of the terrorist attack and the deployment of NSG and Marine Commandos, was criminal. This long gap in time could have been drastically reduced, if the capabilities of the readily available resources were utilised and maximised.

One such resource was the Infantry Battalion of the Indian Army based in Mumbai. An Infantry Battalion constituting of about 850 personnel and four Rifle Companies (120 personnel each) could have neutralised the situation speedily and with lesser number of causalities, as terrorists are most unsettled, tentative and vulnerable in the initial period.

Even discounting 25 percent personnel on leave and on other duties, the balance 600 personnel were enough to undertake all tasks. One Company could have been used for cordoning the area, two Companies for clearing the buildings under siege and one Company kept as reserve. The balance elements of the remaining battalion (Headquarter Company and Support Company) could have been utilised for carrying out mobile patrolling (30-40 vehicles) for ‘area stabilisation’ of the entire Mumbai city.

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The Companies tasked for clearing the buildings, especially the Taj Hotel, could have inserted their men through multiple entry points. These entry points can easily be created by firing anti-tank rounds of 84mm Rocket Launcher at selected points. Thus, a Company of more than 100 personnel could have swamped the entire building and overwhelmed the few terrorists psychologically and physically.

No doubt that the terrorists would have used weapons in retaliation, which they still did. No doubt there would have been causalities, but it would have been much less than the eventual numbers. Infantry personnel are trained for such roles in Urban Insurgency and FIBUA (Fighting In Built-Up Areas).

Also read: Use of Irregulars: Bane for the Pakistan Army

For the Infantry Battalion, the Mumbai operation would have been only a variation of the role performed by the Infantry in parts of Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Northeast and Sri Lanka. The authorities thus failed to employ the precious and readily available resource and under-utilised it for merely putting up ‘cordon’. The primary reason for this omission was that military authorities are not appropriately included in the decision-making loop in the ‘war against terror’, except in difficult, harsh and volatile border regions.

Infantry Battalions are located in all the metros of India. These battalions only need to be equipped with certain specialised equipment like night-vision devices, bullet-proof jackets, some numbers of role-specific small arms, etc. These battalions may not be available for short periods of time, as they have operational responsibilities in different sectors along the border, for which they need to carry out annual exercise and operational rehearsals. To overcome this, in each of the metros, battalions of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) could be re-located by moving them from J&K, where the situation has vastly improved.

Therefore the government’s decision to raise NSG hubs in the metros is an avoidable exercise, rather a knee-jerk reaction. As it is, the NSG also overwhelmingly draws its personnel from the Army.

Even the creation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) is a superfluous endeavour, as its role can be well performed by existing agencies like the RA&W and the IB, given the requisite complements and investigating powers. The NIA is to draw mostly from the same IPS pool, whose (exceptions notwithstanding) inadequacies in dealing with the emerging form of terror are proven. Several hundred crores of rupees will be spent on raising the NSG hubs and the NIA, at the expense of the taxpayers’ money. Instead, a fraction of that money spent in equipping the Infantry Battalions in metros to tackle Mumbai type scenarios would achieve better purpose.

Our propensity to create additional organisations and battalions of para-military forces after every major terrorist incident, at the cost of the exchequer, amounts to pandering to Pakistan’s avowed intention of bleeding India economically and physically through a thousand cuts.

Moreover, reactive and unbridled expansion of the police and the paramilitary forces, at the cost of modernising the existing state police forces, is, in effect, transforming India into a ‘Police State’, which is contrary to the liberal ethos of a democracy.

Indian Hypocrisy And Security

The solution lies in revamping and revitalising the existing resources. The selection and training process of police personnel needs major overhaul. The staffing pattern of our IPS dominated agencies, especially the RA&W, needs to be changed. The IPS is far from a versatile service, which can handle internal security, external security, internal intelligence, external intelligence, technical intelligence aviation issues, maritime problems, Special Forces, foreign policy and strategic issues – all at the same time.

It was felt that the high profile terrorist attack in Mumbai would induce our policy-makers to carry out a cogent overhaul of our intelligence agencies and the officering pattern of our paramilitary forces. The selection of a police officer, who was adviser to the Home Ministry on internal security, at the time of the Mumbai incident as the next RA&W chief, over some very deserving and experienced in-house contenders, has belied all hopes.

A major portion of the R&AW work profile relates to providing foreign policy inputs for which a global and strategic vision is an imperative. Assessment of the strategic reach and military capabilities of target countries is a very important determinant of foreign policy. The job requires people with specific grooming, training and experience. Therefore, the new appointment will only perpetuate the inadequacies and internal rivalries that beset the R&AW. The Mumbai attack has made no difference.

Counter-terror: The state gets some teeth

Again the officering pattern of our paramilitary forces, wherein an IPS officer joins only at the DIG’s level and above, has not been addressed. There is simmering tension in these organisations and this is bound to explode some day. The government cannot allow the erosion of élan and self-pride of all security forces by falling prey to the machinations of the IPS lobby. Yes, the IPS officers are an asset in the furtherance of vote-bank politics, but our politicians must ensure that they (IPS officers) do not manipulate and politicise national security.

Today, since terrorism has acquired the proportion of a vicious war, by non-conventional means, without boundaries and with external and internal dimensions, it has to be fought predominantly by the military in non-conventional ways. The military leadership therefore must have a major say in the decision-making process with regards to combating terror.

In Mumbai like situation, once the battle is joined, the overall command and control should be vested with the military commander. Only a commander, who has led troops in action, has the understanding, wisdom, and moral authority to direct operations. The Army has been fighting insurgency and terrorism in J&K and the Northeast for several years; therefore it should have been considered the most competent organisation to handle the Mumbai crisis.

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